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"Loving Wrong" in the Worlds of Harold Pinter's Moonlight 
and David Mamet's Cryptogram 
Howard Pearce 
. . . th' winds whose pity . . . / Did us but loving wrong. 
(Prospero in The Tempest 1.2.150-51) 
If it were possibly true that life really is a dream, then life's destroyings 
and creatings, wars and loves, might in some way not only derive from, but also 
reflect, a reality that is dreaming us from beyond; and, as we interpret our dreams, 
that dreamer would be upon waking more confidently genuine than we in our 
playing at reality. It could follow, then, that the representation of life as a dream 
might be thought of as merely a verisimilitude, or as an allusive metaphorical 
dimension, or as in some sense a dreamed truth. 
This way of feeling life is traditional and is echoed in the recurrences of 
the metaphors referred to as theatrum mundi and mise en abyme.1 It is possible, 
however, to take life as either simple factuality or mere play, dream, inebriation, 
or game—to reduce it to the literalized metaphor—and to lose the truth and sincerity 
it bears as reflection of some other, perhaps unknown but possibly intuited, in 
some way "true" dimension. Any dimension, seen from within, immerses the 
inhabitant in its versions of truth and reality, its ethics, psychologies, aesthetics, 
politics, religions; but it might direct attention as well to such values as constituted 
in and revealed from some other dimension. When one dimension is, for instance, 
a world known in terms of scientific, naturalistic truths, it is taken as True and Real; 
and it must contend with the "higher" truths of a theology that reads this "natural" 
world as a stage that tests us for a life in Heaven. And, in this abutment of world 
views, the truth must be told; the story must be told. 
Plato's myth of Er dramatizes the story of such an interplay between this 
and that world; for Plato, the life between lives requiring the same commitment to 
knowledge and right action that any incarnation demands.2 The souls in Plato's 
story told by the "warrior bold, Er,"3 gather in a meadow to share stories about 
their 1,000 years "up yonder" or below the earth;4 the story told by Socrates contains 
the story of Er, who becomes "messenger" and is instructed not to drink from the 
river Lethe so that "the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost."5 The 
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verbal construct becomes a record and a creation, for an audience, of a world 
. experienced. Er's story contains the stories of other souls, which are told by a 
prophet serving the messenger as Socrates serves Glaucon and Plato the reader— 
as mentor and interpreter. As I sense and search connections between the "this" 
and the "that," I try to keep open the possibilities of connections, not only the 
relatedness of "worlds" in the sense of their being antithetical locales but also the 
possibility of transmigration from one to another. This relatedness entails those 
worlds in multiple reflections and interplays of both their geographies and the 
texts that preserve and present them—specifically plays, stories, anecdotes, and 
the word-play of metaphors and allusions. If a world is not mere fact but a 
constituted world as idea,it is manifest in the ways it might be imagined, or painted, 
or talked about. So constituted, it becomes an accessible version of reality in 
relationships with others, in represented action, in language, in metaphor, in allusion. 
The doubleness of the literal and figurative meanings in metaphor is an equation 
manque, which instigates the search for relations rather than effecting mathematical 
closure. In allusion, too, the referring obliquely or indirectly generates an activity 
of seeing more rather than fixing, a sense of wonderment rather than simple 
recognition. 
Waking up from a dream is both transition from one state to another and 
also, in itself, a state. When Miranda awakes from the sleep Prospero has induced, 
she declares that the "strangeness" of Prospero's "story put / Heaviness in me,"6 
and Prospero instructs her to "shake it off."7 This condition felt as being between 
two worlds is indeed strange; it becomes an arena where love and strife occur 
within that strangeness, which confirms neither the solid reality of the naturalist's 
certainties about this world nor the spiritual eternality of religious faith in the 
other. Its strangeness suspends the simple reassurances of actuality and finality; 
it becomes a playing with the real as dreams play freely with memories from the day, 
and the drama makes its world and teasingly refers to another. The possibility and 
potentiality of events in this dimension are like the free play of true false events in 
poetry and the imagination. They are the drama of Nathaniel Hawthorne's 
Romance, played on a stage for which the author is empowered to "bring out or 
mellow the lights and deepen and enrich the shadows."8 They are transformed in 
this "moonlight... falling so white upon the carpet... Ghosts might enter here";9 
they are realized not as events confirmed or validated by one or the other of the 
opposed worlds, the world of material Facts or that of spiritual Truth, but as a 
world of potential thought, as conceived or imagined reality: "All these details . . . 
are so spiritualized by the unusual light, that they seem to lose their actual substance, 
and become things of the intellect" (my emphasis). It is the freedom to imagine and 
to discover significance, to be subject to magical changes and to achieve restorative 
transformations, that makes Prospero's island a world of romance, makes the 
"mysterious region" of Er's story, the "meadow" to which the souls journeyed and 
Fall 2000 63 
where they "encamped . . . as at a festival"™ not only an arena for important 
events involving knowledge and choice but also a respite and a sharing of stories. 
The poetry of The Tempest is audacious, affronting the ordinary, the 
predictability and understandability of events. In the last scene Alonso, finding 
their experiences in this place "as strange a maze as e'er men trod" (5.1.242), calls 
for "some oracle" to "rectify our knowledge . . . in this business more than nature / 
Was ever conduct o f (5.1.243-44); and Prospero promises to "resolve" them with 
an interpretation of events that "shall seem probable," an explanation "of every / 
These happen'd accidents" (248-50). The word "accidents" is repeated a few 
moments later when he promises to tell "the story of my life / And the particular 
accidents gone by" (304-05). When the action has ended, Prospero will become 
the interpreter of the events that now seem so strange (and accidental rather than 
probable). Those events will become transformed and worthy as realized in 
narrative or dramatic representation. Telling "the story of my life," he will, having 
been the causal agent in strange but actual events, fulfill his role as poet, playwright, 
and metaphoric god by giving meaning, value, and shape to the events in the telling 
of them. That story as told will be, perhaps can only be, another event, an aftermath 
and consolation, when this confounding strife has ended. 
This quality of "strangeness" on an island or in a meadow or a moonlit 
world envelops the events of Pinter's Moonlight and Mamet's The Cryptogram, 
both plays' characters and actions rooted in and struggling against the determinative 
accidents of the natural world. To the extent that these plays are "poetic,"11 they 
undermine the base of natural assumptions that are offended by hints, by 
allusiveness, by mysterious and strange implications in the events. They seem to 
allude to imaginative works of the past embodying that dynamic, that conflict 
between the unformed raw material of time and the illusion of meaning and form that 
art bestows (and the dream while the dreamer is in it). 
The narrative force of fragmented, episodic events in Moonlight is 
overwhelmed by, and realized as, the strangeness of such poetic value. A man who 
is dying and a wife attending him, Andy and Bel, need their two sons, Jake and 
Fred, who are preoccupied with their own life's business; and the parents need the 
daughter Bridget for apparently other reasons than they need the sons. The 
occasional presence of old friends Maria and Ralph aids in the recall of the past 
during this event of dying. The enveloping presence of the daughter Bridget, 
defined in the dramatis personae as "a girl of sixteen," not only recalls the past but 
also looks to the future, since at the moment of death, if Andy is at that moment 
dying, his concern is with Bridget and her "babies," 1 2 the "three beautiful 
grandchildren" (71); his last words express concern for her—"Tell Bridget I don't 
want her to be frightened" (76). The participation of the sons and the old friends in 
this event is a confirmation of the accidental nature of life, of fragmentariness and 
contingency. They appear not by the probability of actions leading from one event 
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to another, but as if incidental, preoccupied, sometimes dragged on stage; they 
seem to be there by virtue of the dislocations and intrusions as well as the needs of 
the dream state. Although Bridget (at fourteen) seems to be there as the boys are, 
alive with self-interests such as Fred's getting a ride with Jake to a "gig" (30), 
Bridget's wanting "to be alone" like Garbo (30-31) because she wants "to read this 
book" (32), her presence expresses a coherence and meaningfulness that frames 
the play. "Real" events involving others take place in her "playing area" twice: in 
the scene with her brothers when she was fourteen, in the haunting scene at the 
play's center when Andy is searching in the dark for a drink and the "Growing 
moonlight finds BRIDGET in background, standing stiir (48). 
Bridget is alone on her stage when the play begins and when it ends and 
in one other scene; and those events, those brief moments when she appears in her 
world, are "such stuff / As dreams are made on" (Prospero 4.1.156-57)— 
ambiguously.13 In the opening scene she explains her present moment: "There's no 
moon" (1); and in the final she is telling of a past time when she "stood there in the 
moonlight and waited for the moon to go down" (80); her condition of being between 
her parents' world of refractory occurrences and some dimension of clarity and 
continuity suggests that her nature is realized both in real-life events as daughter, 
sister, and mother and also in an imaginative world of Hawthorne's Romance, of 
moonlight. She seems to be for her parents, like Miranda for Prospero, the child 
whose beauty and innocence must be protected, whose welfare requires attentive 
care. Transcending that parental concern, she seems as well to invoke Socrates's 
ideas of the soul transmigrating from dimension to dimension. She is in all three 
of her scenes the traveler. In the first she wants to "go downstairs and walk about" 
(1), but her concern is for her parents, who "need to sleep / in peace and wake up 
rested." In the darkness and silence of that scene, without moon, her "task" is to 
care for them, since she is "all they have left of their life." Idealizing them, as they 
find their life realized in her, she expresses in this scene the need to be alone in the 
dark as well as the attachment of her identity to that of the sleepers. In her second 
scene Bridget describes herself "walking slowly" and alone "in a dense jungle" 
(21). This is a brilliant and rich sensory world, with bright flowers, "soft . . . turf 
under my feet," sounds and smells, the synesthesia of "velvet odour" (22). Being 
hidden in this safe and free world, she is "captive no longer... lost no longer," 
and she has come there through "fierce landscapes . . . stinging nettles . . . 
skeletons," a hellish world where there was "no solace, no shelter." In the invoked 
pastoral world, her being here seems as if she is a being free from care and 
involvement with the cares of others, as for instance when in the other scenes in 
her space she silently watches her father fumbling in the dark and tries to settle her 
brothers' dispute. 
In the play's final scene she is neither free in an idyllic world nor, in the 
dark, bearing the responsibility of her sleeping parents' welfare. Here she tells 
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someone a story about "setting out" for a "house at the end of the lane" (79-80). As 
in the moonless darkness of the opening scene she "can't sleep," in the closing 
scene she tells a story about a time of moonlight, when the action can begin only 
when "the moon is down." Her story about being invited to the party requires a 
waiting for the "moon to go down" so that she can enter the house that "was dark 
and all the windows were dark." At the time of the telling, her mother and her father 
are a vague memory (if the person who "invited [her] to a party" was one of her 
parents). The story invokes the metaphor of her moonlit world being like the 
meadow in Er's story, a place for telling stories, a place between lives, an interim 
and a transition, a readiness and an anticipation. The party she is invited to suggests 
a new life, new experience, the party metaphorically analogous to game, dream, 
stage, story, life. Life as a new play can begin; the curtain can go up, when the 
moon goes down on a world whose moment is its reality. As storyteller she also 
bears a metaphorical relationship to Prospero, speaking perhaps to no one but in 
fact to an available listener, the audience. As Prospero makes clear, the audience 
becomes critic and judge and new agent to decide whether he stays on the island or 
travels home. His being and his world for a bright moment are real in the audience's 
world, and the audience can assume its authentic role. The audience is free to 
interpret Bridget's story, to answer as for Prospero the either-or question of its 
own imagination, to become director of the character's performance (whether her 
lines are delivered toward the audience or not), to discover in Bridget's moment of 
going to a party relationships and meanings and values. Bridget's moonlit state is, 
like that of Miranda's moment between sleeping and being awake, referential. It 
catches an awareness of the before and the after; it alludes, is metaphorically "free" 
of the dramatic plotting and amplification that make life and the mimesis of it 
probable and believable; it is an act of transcending life as calculation and the 
business of being embedded in events rather than making stories about them. Her 
telling the story at the play's end is like Plato's telling the story of Er at the end of 
his proposal for a version of reality, a Republic, and like the tale that Prospero will 
tell. The telling constitutes a view of the events analogous to seeing sub specie 
aeternitatis, to the authorial creation and governance of events with perspicuity. 
Her story is, like Prospero's, dislocated from the events of the plot, generating and 
deriving from a moonlit state. 
Although intimations of their lives' referring beyond the lived events are 
possible for others in Bridget's world, for her parents and her brothers, their 
awareness is grounded in the moment's substantiality of fact, the brothers' getting 
on in the world, the father's getting out of i t In the comic reductio adabsurdum of 
imagining Jake to be a poet ("the real thing . . . the authentic article" [8]), the brothers 
extend his beginning to write poems to and beyond his childhood: "before I could 
read [7] . . . before I was born [8]." Jake and Fred seem to sense their own 
recapitulation of Western philosophy and history, in their identifying with epic 
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heroes like Riley and wondering what "made men of them . . . and Gods" (52); Fred 
"always wanted to be a God." Talking of the progress of modern science, of 
advancements with "things like light-meters" (54), Fred seems aware of a 
contradictory view of time, in that the world is decaying: "They can find whatever 
light is left in the darkV (My emphasis). Making a momentary heroic image of 
their father, they praise him with Hamlet's words: "He was a man, take him for all in 
all, I shall not look upon his like again" (60). Trying to characterize Andy (as, 
throughout the play, people seek or create identities for themselves and for others), 
Bel relates him to an epic past, in that "beneath this vicious some would say 
demented exterior" she sees "a delicate even poetic sensibility, the sensibility of a 
young horse in the golden age, in the golden past of our forefathers" (20). In Andy 
and Bel's speculations on death, Andy worries that if, as Bel says, "Death will be 
your new horizon" (46), he might not move across but "just stay stuck in the 
middle of the horizon." The horizon might become "endless . . . unceasing 
moonlight... or pitch black for ever and ever." This condition is in Andy's 
imagination not the fulfilling meadow or moonlit world of the imagination but a 
reduction of his solid reality, the life he has lived, to the game: if it is going to be 
"pitch black for ever what would have been the point of going through all these 
enervating charades in the first place?" The loss of identity in that place becomes 
terrifying, crawling through a "loophole" and meeting himself coming back, 
"screaming with fright at the sight of a stranger" who is himself in a mirror. Bel 
finally affirms a Platonic consolation for Andy, in that their grandchildren "know 
more about death than we do. We've forgotten death but they haven't forgotten it. 
They remember it" (47). Life need not be thought as having beginning and end, 
but as a state between other states, with the metempsychosis of souls affirmed in 
the awareness that generates stories in the moonlight or the meadow, the state of 
remembering and anticipating other lives. 
Although Mamet's The Cryptogram hews to the line of naturalistic 
plotting, the poetry of strangeness is as alluring and intrusive as in Moonlight. 
Donny, her husband Robert, and Del have been friends since childhood, and Del 
plays the role of parent or older brother to Donny's ten-year-old son John. John's 
sleeplessness, explained by Del as excitement about a trip to the woods with his 
father, is treated with parental concern by Donny and Del. This conventional life 
is exploded when a letter from Robert appears, his announcement that he is leaving 
Donny. As tragedy is supposed to arrive at resolution and understanding, life is 
supposed to be based in the same probability or necessity, which yields its 
coherence. Counterpointed by John's talk of the thing in Del's game that will 
"surprise" them, the shock of Robert's letter is not the "surprise" of tragedy, which 
is accompanied by the consolation that the surprising event is probable or necessary 
and therefore "right," but an unresolved and unexplained fortuity for Donny. The 
resulting shock for her, the disruption of her life, produces attempts to solve the 
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problem in conventional ways (searching, for instance, for the absent husband); 
and the profound mysteries that arise from this surprise scarcely distract her attention 
from the immediate real-life problem. 
When the action ends, questions abound, and the mysteries of past, present, 
and future remain. Who were Del, Donny, and Robert in the past, and what was 
their relationship? Why was Del wearing Robert's shirt when the photograph was 
taken, when was it taken,14 and why are those questions so compelling? What is 
the triadic relationship between the "faggot" Del (94), the husband Robert, and the 
wife? If Del has lied about being at the cabin with Robert, is his explanation about 
the hotel room necessarily the whole truth (72, 74)? What is the outcome of acts 
not yet taken and words not yet spoken? Since in Act 3 John interrupts again, Del 
never says to Donny the "things" he has "been longing to say" when he begins as 
if telling a story: "For a long while . . . " (89) "Here is what I th ink : . . . " (95). 
What will John do with the knife after the play ends? What is the true story of the 
knife and its significance to the character of Robert? Such questions entail acts of 
interpretation, including speculation and supposition, on the parts of both characters 
in the events and the audience. Extrapolated questions in the characters' 
interpretations of the book that appears in Act 3, of the meaning and value of the 
book and the book's world and characters, specifically the Wizard, are for the 
audience mimetic—imposing, metaphorical, and reflective. This text and that are 
analogous. What does such questioning mean in a text and "outside" it? Is the 
play's title, the cryptogram in which "everything means something else,"15 a 
representation in metaphor of such meanings and questionings? Is the epigraph 
about Mrs. O'Leary's lantern meant to raise questions about accidents and human 
inattention and carelessness? About causality and agents of destructive events? 
How are the play's mysteries concerned with design in events both in life and in 
drama, for instance "the three misfortunes" in the hook or "Not in the book, here" 
in reality (30)? Is there a structure of mimetic relationship in the misfortunes there 
and here? What can be concluded about character, as in Del's saying that "the life 
that I lead is trash" (88), and in general about the world, which in her anger Donny 
calls "a cesspool... Because every man I ever met in this shithole . . . " (94; with 
the word "shithole" Donny echoes Del, who has used it earlier [62]). What about 
questions of knowledge and being, as in the lesson Donny seems to have learned 
in the experience of these events (or known already) when she teaches John that 
"Things occur. In our lives. And the meaning of them . . .the meaning of thsm ... 
is not clear" (79)? 
John, with his childish questioning and curiosity and his enthusiasm for 
adventure, is a representation of inexperience and potentiality, the openness to 
and desire for knowledge and experience; and his insistence on having his 
importunate questions heard becomes a voice from the meadow or moonlit world 
that echoes voices from yet another dimension. Naturalistic and psychological 
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explanations of his sleeplessness explain themselves in the ordinary world of 
probability, but they do not explain away possible other interpretations. The 
minimalist drama of naturalism might leave the door open to other worlds.16 Since 
John's situation is never resolved, his angst not merely in the disappointment of 
his father's failure to appear but also for the meanings and values intuited as from 
beyond impels him toward the absent and the unknown. His negotiations between 
the adults and the voices from some other dimension he talks about can be read by 
those adults as dream or imagination, or mere confusion; but in his waking up 
beside Donny and Del in that confusion between dream and waking he echoes 
Miranda's sense of "strangeness." When he asks, "What did they say? What?" 
(43), the "they" is both someone else in the dream and the voices of Del and 
Donny whom he has heard in his sleep. His subsequent asking "Do you ever think 
you hear singing?" (47) invokes music and "voices" as mysterious as the sound 
effects in The Tempest. The music might be "outside" his head, a radio, or "just in 
my head." "Just before" he goes "to sleep" John can "hear voices . . . Outside my 
room" (47-48). He seems to live vitally in and to experience from the point of 
view of that interim state, the near-waking or ambiguous state that desires to 
negotiate between worlds. 
As Del and Donny can express one version of their disillusionment in 
calling the world a naturalistic "shithole," John can raise profound questions about 
illusion and reality, invoking the more romantic metaphor of the theatrum mundi, 
of life as a dream. In the opening of Act 2, dressed for bed, he again expresses his 
sleeplessness as imagining and speculation, as a descant on the question of reality. 
He invokes, as well, persistent questions about art as a representation of reality. 
His correlation of the book with the real world begins with the "thought that maybe 
there was nothing there" (53). By analogy, the buildings in the book are like his 
"globe": "Maybe there's nothing in the buildings . . . or on my globe" Of course, 
the metaphorical relationship extends to the real world, both as it is and in its 
history, in what is not or has not been, and in thought. John maintains that we do 
not know about the reality of history, "the history of things. Or thought." Such 
speculation recalls history, in a way, the historical incidence of speculations about 
reality and how it is represented, as in Shakespeare's globe, his "wooden O." The 
possible inversions of the theater-dream metaphor lead toward questioning whether 
"we are in a dream" (54) and whether there is a dreamer dreaming us. Our thoughts 
and our words ("all we do is say things") make stories about living and dying, 
about life and hell; and perhaps "things . . . go on forever." If John is trying to 
make stories from the vantage of an interim state, from the insights that arise from 
the play between worlds, he is, like Bridget, comparable to the tellers and bringers 
of tales in/from the meadow, the world of moonlight, the aesthetic representation of 
that state as an island. Artists' creations, books and globes and plays, represent a 
world that becomes problematical in the representation of it, are in themselves 
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speculative, and are about relatedness. They provoke that speculation and ask 
leading questions, as for instance the magician in Del's book might suggest a 
comparison of himself with Del, the book might suggest a comparison with 
Prospero's books, and the analogy might extend to this play and its author. 
As sleeplessness dramatizes the tenuous moment of being between, being 
amphibious, the stories of transition from one world to another are in themselves an 
interim, a state between and a referentiality. When at the end of the second act Del 
has revealed that Robert has used his room to be with a woman, Donny tells him to 
"get out" (75) and she is left alone, crying. John enters and asks if she is "dead." 
Again his awareness of her—"I heard you calling"—might be of someone from 
another dimension—"I heard voices"—an under/other world. Although the voices 
seem to have been Donny's and Del's, John speaks of them as if they were from the 
land of the dead: "And so I said,' . . . there's someone troubled.'" His own mobility 
("I walked around . . . and so I went outside") involves him in transition from one 
dimension to another, and in inversions. Outside, "in the dark," he looks back into 
his room to see a candle "burning there" (76). Moving out into the dark, he looks 
back into his own world, his room, and discovers that he is "perfectly alone." The 
movement back into the light retrieves an insight from the darkness that needs to be 
put into words; and the inchoate certainty in this statement needs confirmation, 
from Donny and evidently in writing it. He questions her, "Do you think that I was 
right?"; and he has come "downstairs to write it down." 
John's story, which needs writing, is about discovery, transition, 
transformation, bildung}1 It is about his experience of loss and about his quest for 
understanding. When a month later he persists in questioning a "wish you could 
die" (78-79), Donny teaches him that we have insufficient knowledge ("Things 
occur.... [Their] meaning . . . is not clear" [79]) and inadequate power ("I don't 
control the World" [80]). But she reassures him that "everyone has a story." His 
anguish and loss constitute the story that can be told in the future. Everyone, like 
the souls who meet in the meadow, has a story; and Donny declares that "This is 
yours." Her consolation is for John like Bel's vision of birth as a dying for Andy: 
it refers the personal to the general truth that transcends the moment's actuality 
and pain. To think that one's own story can be told and that it is like others is to 
recognize that the telling of stories happens when the individual is no longer in 
that condition wherein the life is merely being lived, in felt pain or frustration or 
vulnerability, and wherein meaningfulness comes as if from the "inside." John's 
speculations on life as a dream and Bridget's story of going to a party are such 
views from beyond the events of a life as a drama, in which the one who might tell 
the story is the protagonist. This generalizing impulse, the need to transcend the 
contingency of events in time, seeing the personal life in terms of similarities to 
others' lives, is to put the event into play as if that protagonist could be someone 
else. An actual life thought about as if it were a story, by which the telling constitutes 
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and maintains its particularity, can be a relief from the burden of the actual, the 
serious. The identity of the self seen from this angle is not, then, felt as the 
contradictory eternal and fixed self caught in the flux of time but as a possible 
version of a self who could be somebody else in another dimension—as that other 
dimension constitutes itself, its truths and values, and is constituted by its own 
internality and by its reference to and derivation from another. The message from 
Lachesis, "the maiden daughter of Necessity" who sings of "things that were," is 
that souls who are at "the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where 
birth is the beacon of death" must "select a life to which he shall cleave of 
necessity."18 In the toils of that new necessity, the soul might suffer a complete 
amnesis or might like John or Bridget or the child in Thomas Traherne's poems, 
for instance "Shadows in the Water," see as if through the "Water's brink" into 
other dimensions.19 The "sweet Mistake" of "unexperienc'd Infancy"20 might 
yield an affirmative vision of those in another dimension, those "Whom I so near 
me, throu the Chink, / With Wonder see . . . / Our second selves those Shadows 
be."2 1 
As opposed to Traherne's joyous affirmation, the uncertainty implicit in 
John's erasure of substance and form, habitation and name, and in Bridget's 
shadowy intimations seems to reduce this world's meaning and value and put 
convictions into abeyance. Yet if life becomes game or play it is not reduced to a 
thoughtless activity of performance, the rote moves of a pawn. The game is 
metaphorical and allusive, as are events and identities: it refers to past instances, to 
the pattern or "rules" of play, to anticipated repetitions, and to analogical 
performances such as the drama and a life. The magical banquet and show Prospero 
creates for Ferdinand and Miranda is not merely a "baseless fabric" (4.1.151) but 
a representation of insubstantiality—of the "great globe itself and of "all which it 
inherit" (153-54). The game of chess Miranda and Ferdinand are "discovered" 
playing in the last act affords a moment of speculation on the game, on meanings 
and relationships. Miranda first charges that Ferdinand "play[s] me false" (5.1.172), 
a literal statement—about how he is playing this chess game—that is expressed in 
the language of lovers and thus means more. Her change of heart upon his denial 
calls for deeper speculation: "Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle, / 
And I would call it fair play" (174-75). Whether she still remarks about the game 
or defines herself in their relationship that transcends the game, she can be read as 
projecting a future and elevating the story of their life. The game is not only a 
device, a convenient point of reference, for such observation but also a 
representation of the idea of how the game of life is played. She knows herself, 
her capacity to love and her power of transforming the actual into beneficent and 
beneficial illusion; she knows how she plays the game. 
By the game and the play life becomes explicable, if not fully known at 
least an operatively knowing process that yields itself to the telling of stories about 
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it. Miranda makes the mere game metaphorical; Andy challenges the interpretation 
of life as meaningless if the "enervating charades" are played in a context of "pitch 
black forever" (46). As Maria reminds Jake and Fred, they first met Ralph when "he 
was refereeing a football match" (16), and Andy defines Ralph by that role of 
referee: "Referees are not obliged to answer questions. Referees are the law. . . . 
They have a whistle . . . And that whistle is the articulation of God's justice" (68). 
The human figure who plays the role of referee can be understood by his likeness 
to God (and by analogy to any other author of worlds). Ralph, seeking definition of 
the identities of Jake and Fred, reads them of course in terms of his own pursuit of 
careers in art, music, pretensions as "thinker," and "amateur refereeing": "Were you 
keen on the game of soccer when you were lads, boys?" (27-28). His own life of 
retirement, his and Maria's having moved to "a place in the country" with "a small 
lake" (68-69), means that he has "given up refereeing." Maria remembers the children 
in terms of the "word games we all used to play" (16), and life's rhythm in the play 
becomes manifest as wordplay. Bel praises one of Andy's rhetorical deliveries, not 
in terms of the substance of what he has said but in response to his verbal skill: 
"What a lovely use of language" (19). 
In one of their fugues on identity, Fred & Jake's pervasive gamesmanship 
characteristically takes the form of name-dropping, knowing and naming and 
mistaking identities: Fred's name is Macpherson, not Gonzalez (23), and 
"Kellaway's other name" is Saunders, which Fred says is Jake's name (27). The 
name-dropping about attendees at a meeting (41-44) invokes not only the inane 
repetition of names beginning with "B" but also implications of intrigue and power 
struggles. The penultimate scene, followed by Bridget's story about the party, 
reveals Fred and Jake impressed by the names of attendees at "d'Orangerie's 
memorial" (77-79) and by the number of "very moving speeches" paying tribute 
to d'Orangerie. Language as performance might become an expression of tribute, 
honor, exaltation—whether genuine, or mere performance, or ulterior in motive. 
In their first scene in the play, Fred and Jake, speaking of him in the past tense, pay 
tribute to their father (Jake's father in this story); the vicar delivered an eloquent 
encomium for Andy at a "trustees meeting" (12-13), at which Andy too delivered 
"the speech either of a mountebank—a child—a shyster—a fool—a villain—" 
(15). The vicar's speech praising Andy's "rare and unusual" giving of "his personal 
fortune to his newborn son the very day of that baby's birth" (12) has become 
echoed as Jake's tribute to his father; and Fred notes (55-56) that the story, like 
history of an epic past, is founded in "deep-seated rumour" and might be nothing 
more than fiction, "in the lowest category of Ruritanian fantasy." The language 
game easily ranges from the sometimes thoughtless and rote games of repetition 
and echo, pretense and power play, toward the impulse to create and transform, to 
elevate and preserve through tribute, to tell stories, to preserve a past in legend, 
and to create works of art. 
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Although Del and Donny might be read as like Jake and Fred, being caught 
up in the game of their life—discovering secrets and hiding truths, feeling pain and 
alienation, asking for love and understanding, trying to model a life according to 
others' representations of morals and responsibilities—they seem to take life more 
seriously. Having failed in his attempt to find Robert for Donny, Del offers to play 
cards, Casino or Gin; and her refusal leads to their having a drink, which Del justifies 
as a "ceremony... of inebriation . . . of togetherness" (60). Del as mentor educes 
from the eager John an engagement with both the game and the story. The game he 
devises for John in Act One is not mere pastime or diversion but, like some works of 
art (or appreciations of them) educative. John can play it with his father up at the 
cabin; it will "'sharpen your skills'" and "caid your camping'" (32). The procedure 
is to "write down your recollections. Of the things you've seen. During the day. 
Then you compare them . . . To see who has observed the best" (33). (John's 
wanting to "write down" what he has learned at the end of Act Two [76] echoes this 
instruction and implies a lesson-about writing things down-learned from the game.) 
The game could be "useful" because "If you were lost it could assist you to orient 
yourself (34). It is, of course, about memory—"you see whose recollection was 
more accurate" (33)—and about the problem of experiencing things in a world of 
change: they "couldn't choose the pond [to test their memory] . . . Because it's 
changing" (35; repeated 36). Involving criteria for experiencing life—sharp perception 
of things as they appear, precise and accurate memory, careful recording of events— 
the game is both mimetic and integral; like the moonlit world and the dramatic 
representation, it refers to life and is an event in life; it is an interim, an island of 
seeming and being that reflects and impinges. The game, then, refers to the past 
and the future, as memory and anticipation; and the act of writing things down is a 
preservation and a utility for the future. It like the story and the play represents its 
own fragility in time and its need for realization of form as an appreciation of life. 
The book is invoked in the first act of The Cryptogram and appears in Act 
Three, when Del first gives it to Donny (88) and then to John (97). It reveals in that 
giving an impulse to show appreciation for its significance and value by passing it 
on to another; it reveals as well the muddle of remembering and cross purposes and 
the need to find or create design, as in understanding and seeing clearly the "three 
misfortunes." Talking of it in Act One as if it were scripture, John pursues the 
sequence of its principle of three misfortunes in their own immediate circumstances, 
from the first, the teapot that Donny broke, to the second, the blanket that John has 
torn, and to "waiting for" the third (28). In truth, Donny argues, John did not tear 
the blanket: "That happened long ago . . . You can absolve yourself (30). John's 
evidence, that he heard it tear, up in the attic, does not pertain. Reading life by a text 
that should yield understanding only demonstrates the problematical relationship 
between the coherence of thought in the text, its created form, and the life that 
makes itself in reference to the other world of the text. John's attempt to construct 
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an understanding by seeing a structure of repetition elicits Del's denial. Del's 
admonition that "in reality, things unfold . . . independent of our fears of them" (31) 
teaches the lesson that belief and fear, as well as trusting to a bestowed form for 
interpreting, are of the subjective dimension and that "things" in the material world 
are not determined by the subjective. The book, then, imposes a connection that 
might or might not be instructive. It seems, as the product of a subjectivity, as text, 
as work of art, to project for its reader as the play repeats and projects. It is tempting 
to think of the play's ending in anticipation of the third misfortune, to concentrate 
on the knife that John takes with him upstairs, to wonder what he will do with it— 
perhaps not to remember that John takes the book with him as well. Del has given 
him practical advice along with the book, about using it for going to sleep; and he 
quotes the Wizard in formalizing the gift: "It was my copy. It's yours now. 'That's 
what the Wizard said.' It's yours" (97). Echoing the Wizard, Del identifies himself 
with that voice of power, benevolence, and wisdom; but that character, speaking 
like John's voices from a dimension of spirits and powers, contradicts Del's advice 
about things unfolding "independent of our fears." John and Del have shown in 
the first act their fellowship as devotees of the Wizard: Del has replied "That's what 
the Wizard said" to John's quoting the Wizard, "'When we think of sickness, 
sickness is approaching,' said the Wizard" (29). Del is both a responsible mentor in 
reality and an echo and a stand-in for that teacher from another world whose 
values, whose interpretation of reality, are not readily grasped and retained in this 
one, are perhaps for this world merely fictional and false. John has already learned 
from the Wizard, who is a figure of potency for John and Del, a lesson about the 
interdependence of the subjective and the objective, the impingement of the worlds 
of ideas and of "things."22 
This fellowship seems to set Del and John apart from Donny: when they 
perform a litany from the fantasy and invite her to join them, she replies, "I don't 
remember it" (14); and when John talks of the "Third Misfortune" she asks, "What 
does he mean?" (28). Del attempts to give her the book before he gives it to John 
(88), and the idealized world, that particular world of fantasy, seems not to have 
captured her imagination. She does, however, have an instinct for, a vulnerability 
to, another world, another illusion. Before she learns of her husband's betrayal, 
she laments the passing of things, how "it goes so quickly" (22), and Del helps her 
in a brief "meditation" (23) to imagine herself as a "monk" in an "Oriental Fantasy." 
Their imaginations of this monk in his world differ, however, in that while the 
monk's sitting and gazing out is for Donny a gazing "out at his domain" the action 
is for Del "a form of meditation . . . A form. Of meditation. (Pause.) As are they 
all." Dormy's imagination wants the ideas of self-determination, of release from 
responsibility, of detachment; Del's pursues ideas consistent with his interest in 
"connection, in "togetherness"—whether in a world of fantasy or in a monk's or 
others' meditations—that takes them beyond themselves. 
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Del's attempts to touch Donny as well as John express a need for 
community. When Donny has "hurt" him, scoffing at him as a "fool" and a "'fairy"' 
because he has believed Robert's story about getting the knife, Del stresses his 
isolation: "I live in & Hotel" (87). He cares for and cares about John and Donny, but 
himself needs approval and support from Donny. Although Donny's refrain of 
alienation at the end of the play is "I don't care"—the words repeated concerning 
Del, John, and herself—Del's concern is for harmony. He needs from her, 
specifically, forgiveness: "I need you to forgive me" (94); but he is concerned that 
her forgiving him should make her "happy." Amidst misunderstandings, the 
restricted perceptions of this world of accident, and the illusions created even in 
trying to make things right, "loving wrong" is performed in acts intended to generate 
and express love and harmony. In the last scene Del brings the knife as a gift for 
John and the book for Donny (83). Donny destroys his illusions about the symbolic 
gift from the boy's father the hero, the "propitiation . . . [for] the boy"; and the 
book, which Del has thought to be Donny's, kept by him "[a]ll these years" (83), is 
his own copy with his "name in it" and an inscription "'May you always be as . . . " ' 
(88). Expressions and acts of love, of the need for harmonious relations, are easily 
undermined, and good intentions often become deflected. When the goodness of 
one's own actions is questionable, the consequence of such attempts as Del's might 
be his self-condemnation: "The life that I lead is trash. I hate myself (88). The 
pursuit of values impinging from other worlds—some idealized fantasy fiction, 
intimations of a previous world, dictates from heaven, John's disembodied voices, 
stories told by Bridget in the moonlight—expresses the need for assurance and the 
stability of knowing meaning and value, whether generated in the actual, inherited 
from the past, or derived from elsewhere. 
In the confusion of things experienced and not fully known, things like 
the lake, which cannot be used in the game to sharpen the memory because it 
"changes," what then are the sources for ethical actions and how are lightness and 
goodness of actions known? Del's contradiction of the Wizard's truth that thought 
of sickness announces its approach bestows on John what would appear to be, 
from the truth of the Wizard's world, a betrayal. Donny's accusation that John has 
"promised" and "lied," her withdrawal of affection—"I love you, but I can't like 
you" (97)—is a betrayal as well, which John recognizes, reminding her that she 
has promised him that "I could have the blanket" (98). Del, John's spiritual guide 
into the world of fiction, has finally at the play's end joined with Donny as mortal 
voices demanding obedience to social forms—John's saying "I'm sorry" (100)— 
in that world of confusion and loss, of deafness to his voices. Donny's complaint 
that John treats her "like an animal" (99) is a remonstrance against the naturalistic 
world she and Del in their dismay define their world to be. Their demand for 
responsible and moral actions is in itself an affirmation of belief that their world is 
not a "shithole"; and it implicitly allows questions whether there could be 
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transcendent knowledge about this world and ethical values not determined by law 
and custom in it. Their care for John and their teaching are like "the winds" for 
Prospero, whose "pity . . . / Did us but loving wrong." Del's plea is that "if once we 
could speak the truth, do you see, for one instant. Then we would be free" (87-88), 
presumably a truth that he and Donny have not spoken and are not able to speak; 
a truth that might yet be heard—from a book, from a representation, from another 
world, from hearing mysterious voices, from adventuring. The freedom to range 
beyond the world of determinism and contingency, error and circumstance, would 
be a freedom in mobility and in the possibility of knowing more, perhaps a journey 
into another dimension for the discovery of genuine and lasting values, perhaps an 
acquisition of lore or stories for retelling to those embalmed in the actualities and 
ambitions of this world. 
Bridget's journeying in Moonlight is such a movement between worlds, 
her voice an articulation from a dimension that for her family yields only translunary 
hints and contradictory intimations. Her moonlit world like John's raises questions 
about values by which the others in her world seem driven, their assumed roles 
and purposes that become determinative forces. The game Jake and Fred play 
with Bel, answering the telephone "Chinese laundry?" when she calls to say their 
"father is very ill" (73),23 is self-fulfilling mere gamesmanship, and Bel succumbs 
to the game, asking finally "Do you do dry cleaning?" A noble past seems to echo 
for the characters as in T. S. Eliot's poetry, both as an invocation of moving and 
reassuring truths and as a mocking voice receding into the darkness. In the sons' 
first scene Jake has found Fred in bed, "Cheerful though gloomy. Uneasily poised" 
(6); and Jake provides reassurance by quoting the line "All will be well. And all 
manner of things shall be well," perhaps from Eliot's Four Quartets, perhaps from 
Eliot's source Dame Julian of Norwich.2 4 Although the voice in Eliot's poem 
considers "the use of memory" to be "for liberation—not less of love but expanding/ 
Of love beyond desire," 2 5 the words lead Fred and Jake to nothing beyond 
themselves, themselves as momentary and protean players of roles. 
Bel's echoes of Platonic metempsychosis in the idea of children's 
remembering "death . . . the moment before their life began" (47), the building of 
identities out of an epic or heroic past, the maintaining of ostensible virtue and 
right actions in living models to be emulated—these shards of nobility never surely 
result in anything more than repetition, in the competitive desires in this world and 
in the "loving wrong" of actions toward the elusive children. It seems that Andy 
is at last, at the proverbial door of death, more aware of and concerned for Bridget 
and perhaps for others than in his ordinary living relationships with anyone: in the 
central scene he stands in the darkness, Bridget appears in moonlight, and he says 
to no one in particular, "Ah darling. Ah my darling" (49); his last words in the play 
are "Why don't they come in? Are they frightened? Tell them not to be frightened 
. . . Tell Bridget not to be frightened" (76). Parental wrong is denied by the se) 
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interested parents in Moonlight, as by the self-congratulatory protestations of 
such parents as Maisie's in Henry James's What MaisieKnew, and Maisie is another 
demonstration that children like John and Bridget represent the uncertainty of the 
origins of value while embodying the values themselves. Bridget, John, and Maisie 
preserve or move toward outlooks that their parents feel and desire but cannot 
achieve and retain. Maisie succeeds through a persistence that is manifest in her 
equanimity in accepting the loss of Sir Claude at the novel's end, and her journeying 
has produced a maturation that can be sensed and appreciated but not analyzed. 
One expression of the adult's need for the child as idea of virtue and for the virtue 
itself appears in the way the world, feeling its deprivation, echoes values from the 
past and desires the equanimity, the potential, of the elusive child it, contradictorily, 
would train and make a place for in the common world. 
The intuition that life is a dream or a play does not bring to resolution 
those doubts and contradictions of life, nor does it answer the need to live ethically 
in a context of fluctuation and detrition. The persistent conviction, however, that 
truths are fixed, that a moment's version of reality is the only truth, might be put 
into abeyance by entertainment of Bridget's or John's, Maisie's or Miranda's point 
of view. That point of view, open to the impinging game, the play, the story, can 
bring to the lived event meaningfulness and purposefulness and might allow an 
importing of values as if from the meadow or the moonlight. Guiding imperatives 
such as Donny's dictum that "we have to learn to face ourselves" (80) can be read 
as bland, rote assurance or as intuited truth; her playing the derived role of parent 
creates out of ferocity and resentments a gentleness like Prospero's for the child. 
Although Del's interpretation of her remains untold, he instigates for John the 
voyages into games of life and into books of truth-in-fiction that are discovery and 
bildung. Characters in Moonlight make themselves from remainders of the past 
made up like a game or story. To the extent that they are busy and inept magicians 
of their created lives they hear only faintly or inattentively, if at all, the voice from 
the moonlight. Yet they continually read or echo the influential books of ethics 
and knowledge that comment on their mistakes, their false giving and motives, 
their negligence. Gamesmanship and mere fictions have not erased the potential 
meaningfulness and purposiveness of life, rather pointing up its structures of 
relationship, its capacity for being transformed into structure. They manifest the 
need for values that last, that transcend the undermining of values in accidents, 
inattention, carelessness, hidden agents, and mystery. And they do not erase the 
mystery, mystery founded in discrepancies—between truths, between worlds. After 
all, could Mrs. O'Leary's leaving "A lantern in her shed" be an act of kindness? 
Could it be "Loving wrong?" The "loving wrong" of nature and of human beings 
are wrong and error in the world, the wrong of the actual that disappoints the ideal, 
wrong that is unintentional, then, if "loving," wrong particularly to the child who 
embodies the dream. The ethical is complicit with the epistemological, involving us 
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in the need for knowing that comes of the interpretation of the strangeness, the 
moonlit world, the event in the meadow that seems so irresolvable in interpretation 
or so unacceptable to the world's understanding. Is such interpretation inevitably 
rooted in mere presuppositions and imaginings, or is it an opening to a "brave new 
world" made possible by experiencing the strange, perhaps the alien child, the 
"puer" (of James Hillman's "psychological phenomenology") whose "impulses 
[are] messages from the spirit or . . . calls to the spirit"?26 
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